Why the DXY?

The Dollar Index (DXY) is usually considered a trading equivalent of the spot currencies on which it is based. But despite its firmly speculative nature, the index has been no more volatile than its currency components over the past year and in specific cases it has been considerably less so.

The DXY is composed of a basket of five currencies, Euro 57.6%, Yen 13.6%, Sterling 11.9%, Canadian Dollar 9.1%, Swedish Krona 4.2%, and Swiss Franc 3.6%. The index, whose futures trade on the Intercontinental Exchange, was originally created in 1973 by JP Morgan. It components have only been rebalanced once for the inception of the Euro.

Indices are private trading vehicles designed to reflect market interest and to be instruments that traders find useful for speculation. They are designed solely to attract trading enthusiasm; they are not necessarily intended to accurately reflect the economic or financial realities of the currency or its country.

The DXY does not mirror the United States trade position in the global economy. It is heavily weighted to Europe, undervalues the Canadian Dollar, ignores South Korea Taiwan and by necessity China. A firm cannot settle a trade flow in the DXY nor is it particularly useful as a hedge because of the specific matrix of its components. But because of these non-economic aspects, an index may conceivably reflect speculative currency opinion more accurately than the underlying currencies. Indices are not directly buffeted by trade flows, subject to investment and capital controls, banking regulation and other rules and regulation impinging on currency speculation except as they affect the constituent components of the index. The speculative urge should dominate the index. For these reasons the DXY and other instruments like it are thought to reflect overall speculative dollar sentiment without the complicating factors of economics and finance. As example if dollar sentiment is negative then it could be more negative in an index because the makeup of open positioning will only be between the overall positive and negative market sentiment for the currency. From a trader’s point of view, the more an index reflects speculative intent the more volatility it is likely to contain and the more it will move. Movement equals profit, or at least potential profits. Over the past year dollar sentiment has boomed during the acute crisis phase of the financial crisis, from September to early March for most currencies, and then beat a long retreat as the fear of world economic collapse has ebbed. Is this movement reflected in the volatility of the DXY and does it compare to the shifts in its major components? During the Dollar positive phase of the crisis, the DXY gained 18% (9/22/08-3/4/09). In the same time frame the US Dollar added 16% versus the Euro (9/22/08 to 3/4/09 and 22% from the 7/15/08 low), 26% against the Sterling (9/18/08 to 1/23/09), 8% against the Swiss Franc (9/22/08-3/12/09), and 27% versus the Canadian Dollar. The American Dollar lost 0.5% % against the Yen from September to early April but gained 16% from its December low to its April 4th high. The Yen is the exception to the general improvement in the Dollar in this period because its valuation was driven by the precipitous fall in the Yen crosses. The Yen crosses had to reach their nadir which the Euro/Yen did on January 21st before the Dollar could begin to trade higher on its own against the Japanese currency. Since the index reached its crisis high on March 4th of this year it has lost 16% to Friday’s close. In that same period and from its March high the Dollar lost 19% against the Euro, 23% against the Sterling (from 3/11), 12% versus the Yen, 15% against the Swiss Franc and 19% against the Canadian. The Dollar lost more against each component currency except the Yen and the Swiss that it did in the DXY. From a speculative trading perspective, as least during the Dollar retreat, the components were the place to be. The peculiar conditions of the financial crisis may have played a large part in this unusual volatility in the real rather than the created currency. The salient fact in the first phase of the crisis was the pursuit of safety by any means. The currency flows during this period were a flood into dollar assets and then in the work out phase an even greater flood out. It seems that when these flows were added to the normal speculative positioning in the currencies they added substantially to the volatility in the real rather than the DXY. The trading advantage of the currencies over the Dollar Index was most pronounced in the Dollar retreat. Once the reasons for the Dollar ascent in the acute phase of the crisis became clear, and it also became evident that the government rescues would succeed, large speculative interest joined the simple reversal of the pro-Dollar risk aversion trade. These speculative positions were all against the Dollar. Once traders had a chance to assay the situation it became obvious that the abnormal piling into Dollar assets would reverse and the market would join in the rout. In currency trading the advantage for potential profitability between a derivative and its underlying generally lies with the underlying instrument. For the Dollar Index it is no different. Even during the immense dislocation of the financial crisis the greatest potential for profit was in the spot currencies themselves.